Do Partisan Types Stop at the Water’s Edge?

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A growing number of analyses presume that distinctive “partisan types” exist in the American public’s eyes in foreign policy, with implications for questions ranging from the ability of leaders to send credible signals by going against their party’s type to the future of bipartisanship in foreign policy. We offer the first systematic exploration of partisan types in foreign affairs, exploring their microfoundations and scope conditions using two national survey experiments. We find that partisan types vary across foreign policy issues, but are generally weaker and less distinct in foreign affairs than in domestic politics. We also find that there is an impressive amount of congruence between the partisan stereotypes Americans hold and actual distributions of partisan preferences. Our findings have important implications for the study of public opinion, “against-type” models, and the domestic politics of interstate conflict.

Do the Democratic and Republican parties have distinct types in foreign policy in the eyes of domestic audiences? A growing amount of work on the domestic politics of foreign policy and international relations (IR) presumes they do, arguing that Republicans are from Mars, and Democrats are from Venus. Republicans are hawks, while Democrats are doves (e.g., Gries 2014); Democrats favor working multilaterally, while Republicans are more willing to go it alone (e.g., Rathbun 2011); Republicans are more likely to favor free trade, while Democrats are more likely to be protectionist (e.g., Milner and Judkins 2004); and so on, such that the two parties have distinct foreign policy brands in the eyes of the public (Saunders 2018; Schultz 2005). If foreign policy was once characterized by bipartisanship— with politics “stopping at the water’s edge”—it is now commonly argued that policy making regarding international affairs is becoming increasingly polarized (e.g., Hurst 2014; Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007).

The potential existence of distinct partisan types in foreign affairs has significant stakes for a series of important debates in IR. The first concerns the domestic politics of costly signaling. As a swiftly proliferating literature influenced by formal models of legislative bargaining tells us, if political parties have distinct types in foreign issues in the eyes of domestic audiences, and voters are uncertain about the merits of a policy proposal, parties can attempt to send more credible signals and induce greater public support by going “against type” (e.g., Cukierman and Tommasi 1998; Fehrs 2014; Kreps, Saunders, and Schultz 2018; Matters and Weeks 2019a; Saunders 2018; Schultz 2005). Yet parties need to be seen as having distinct types in order to be able to go against them profitably—a claim that has yet to be systematically explored.

The second concerns the study of interstate conflict. A growing body of research argues that Democratic and Republican administrations are treated systematically differently in both conflict and cooperation because strategic actors abroad are also aware of parties’ reputations. The distinctiveness of partisan types has thus been linked to everything from the rate at which the United States is targeted in disputes to the credibility of American threats and reassurances (Clare 2014; Clark, Fordham, and Nordstrom 2011; Foster 2008; Prins 2001). If partisan types are relatively weak in the eyes of domestic
audiences, but relatively stark in the eyes of foreign ones, this raises important questions about the microfoundations of these models.

The third involves a series of debates about how the public forms judgments about foreign policy issues more generally. Four of the major questions in public opinion in the 21st century—the power of elite cues (e.g., Berinsky 2009), the extent of partisan polarization (e.g., Busby et al. 2013; Chaudoin, Milner, and Tingley 2010), the prevalence of motivated reasoning (e.g., Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014), and the collective rationality of the public more generally (e.g., Page and Shapiro 1992) depend in part on the distinctiveness of partisan types. When the two parties are perceived as sending different messages in foreign affairs, elite cues should be easier to follow, polarization in the public should be higher, the prospects of bipartisanship in foreign affairs will be ever-more fleeting, and partisan-motivated reasoning should be stronger. Moreover, if the partisan stereotypes that the public perceives in foreign policy are grossly inaccurate when compared to the actual distribution of partisan preferences on foreign policy issues, it raises further questions about whether the public is sufficiently competent to espouse judgments in foreign affairs (Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017).

Despite the frequency with which partisan types are implicated by the IR literature, there is an absence of work that has systematically investigated the microfoundations or scope conditions of partisan types in foreign policy. In this article, we offer the first systematic exploration of partisan types in foreign affairs. First, we conceptualize partisan types, drawing from a diverse body of literature on the structure and content of stereotypes in social psychology, as well as the study of party brands in American politics, to suggest an empirical strategy political scientists can use to study the content and intensity of partisan types. We then describe the experimental design of two original national surveys in the United States, the first fielded several months before the 2014 midterm elections and the second fielded several months after the 2018 midterm elections. These studies, which measure partisan stereotypes for 51 policy statements, representing 32 unique policies altogether, let us examine the range of issues in which the mass public perceives the Republican and Democratic parties as having distinctive types, along with how these partisan stereotypes have changed between the Obama and Trump administrations.

Our findings suggest that there is significant variation across foreign policy issues: partisan types are relatively weak across many traditional foreign policy issues (e.g., arms control, interventionism, unilateralism, trade), but are somewhat more distinct in those crossover issues that relate more closely to domestic politics (e.g., immigration, defense spending). Against scholarship in American politics that claims the public is too ignorant to have meaningful opinions or identify party positions (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964), we also show that there is an impressive amount of congruence between the partisan stereotypes Americans hold and the actual distributions of partisan support in our surveys and that changes in stereotype content between 2014 and 2018 closely align with actual changes in partisan preferences in this period. Our findings thus not only contribute to ongoing debates in American foreign policy, but also raise important scope conditions for signaling models relying on the assumption of distinct partisan types, suggest that the bipartisan tradition in American foreign affairs is likely to be more persistent than many critics allege, and raise questions about the microfoundations of models of interstate conflict that expect systematic differences in how Democratic and Republican administrations are treated by adversaries abroad.

PARTISANSHIP AND PARTISAN TYPES

In the past several decades, a robust literature has emerged on partisanship in foreign policy (e.g., Busby et al. 2013; Gowa 1998; Holsti and Rosenau 1990; Milner and Tingley 2015), much of which explores whether partisanship “matters” in foreign affairs or instead stops at the water’s edge. Yet partisanship can matter in foreign policy in two different ways. Much of the time, IR scholars focus on a direct pathway in which partisans possess distinctive foreign policy preferences, which leads to divergent foreign policy behaviors. Rathbun (2004), for example, shows that right- and left-wing governments conduct humanitarian interventions differently, because they understand the world in different ways. Reifler, Scotto, and Clarke (2011) find that Labour and Conservative supporters in the British public have different attitudes about international affairs. Koch and Sullivan (2010) demonstrate that left-wing governments are less likely to stay in conflicts because left-leaning voters are less supportive of the use of force. Fordham (1998) suggests that Democratic and Republican presidents tend to use force under different economic conditions because their constituencies care about different economic problems. Work in this tradition tends to understand political parties as coalitions of individuals bound together by shared beliefs, such that studying the effect of partisanship in foreign affairs is largely about mapping the political consequences of these ideological differences.1

1. Of course, not everyone thinks of parties in ideological terms: scholars of American politics often discuss as parties as identity attachments rather than ideological commitments (Mason 2018), and the elite cue-taking literature in foreign policy thinks about partisanship less in terms of ideological gaps and more in terms of information sources (Berinsky 2009).
Yet there is another way for partisanship to matter in foreign policy—an indirect pathway, in which parties have brands or reputations (Snyder and Ting 2002; Woon and Pope 2008), and the existence of these reputations affects parties’ strategic incentives, on the one hand, and the behavior of both voters at home and actors abroad, on the other (e.g., Foster 2008; Koch and Cranmer 2007; Schultz 2005; Trager and Vavreck 2011). This mechanism arises in a variety of contexts: Kreps and colleagues (2018), for example, argue that hawkish brands give Republican presidents an advantage in ratifying arms control agreements; Trager and Vavreck (2011) argue that voters are more likely to support wars started by Democratic presidents because the public assumes Democrats are doves; Foster (2008) shows that the popular association between the political right and hawkishness means that right-wing parties are less likely to be the target of military challenges; Saunders (2018) finds that concerns about their party’s dovish stereotype lead Democratic presidents to be especially sensitive to their most hawkish advisors; and so on. While the content of these theoretical accounts differ—in some cases, parties are penalized by their brand, in others, they are advantaged by it; in some cases, the relevant audience is at home, in others, it is abroad—they nonetheless share a common mechanism implicating second-order beliefs: the notion that parties are seen as having distinct “types” in foreign affairs.

Several definitional points are worth noting. First, we define types more generally as socially shared “beliefs about the characteristics, attributes, and behaviors” of particular actors (Hilton and von Hippel 1996, 240). Although types may be built upon past actions (e.g., previous reluctance to work with the United Nations may give Republicans reputations for unilateralism), for the types to have any traction, they must be socially shared by the audience; in this sense, they can also be thought of as reputations, in that they are beliefs about an actor that exist in the minds of others (Brutger and Kertzer 2018; Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth 2014). Above all else, they are stereotypes, in that they are beliefs about the characteristics of other groups (Hilton and von Hippel 1996, 240), specifically the groups’ policy preferences.2

Second, types reside at multiple levels: we can understand types as operating at the level of the individual leader based on leaders’ policy stances and at the level of political parties more broadly. Although both variants are significant, we focus here on partisan types—which in an American context consists of beliefs about the policy preferences of Republicans and Democrats—consistent with a rich literature on party brands in American politics (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Goggin, Henderson, and Theodoridis 2020; Snyder and Ting 2002; Woon and Pope 2008).3 We choose to focus on partisan types specifically here for a number of reasons, chief of which is that partisanship is one of the more powerful forces in American politics (Levendusky and Malhotra 2016; Mason 2018). Whether because of selection effects ex ante or legislative constraints ex post, the scope and strength of partisan types determines how much latitude individual leaders have to establish types of their own. Moreover, at least in the United States, partisan types are typically understood as more enduring than individual-level types: individual leaders come and go, but parties persist, such that party reputations are an important electoral resource (Snyder and Ting 2002; Woon and Pope 2008). Voters lack the time and capacity to familiarize themselves with each individual candidate’s position on every issue and thus turn to parties instead (Lupia and McCubbins 2000; Rahn 1993). Especially in foreign affairs, it often takes time for leaders to build up independent types, as most political candidates do not have the chance to develop clear and distinctive types on foreign policy issues before entering office, compounded by electoral incentives for candidate ambiguity (Tomz and Van Houweling 2009) and the tendency of the media to “devote little attention to reporting candidates’ positions” (Conover and Feldman 1989, 912). It is perhaps for a similar reason that the voluminous literature on stereotypes in social psychology inevitably thinks of stereotypes as something that refers to groups rather than discrete individuals, since the efficacy of stereotypes in person-perception hinges on the perceiver drawing inferences about an individual through social categorization.4

Finally, partisan types can matter for either domestic or foreign audiences. In some of the IR literature in which this mechanism arises, the key audience is foreign decision-makers figuring out whether to target a state or reciprocate a threat and using the partisanship of the target’s government as a heuristic for doing so (Foster 2008); in others, it is

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2. As with the stereotype literature more generally—which argues that stereotypes need not be accurate in order to be widely held (Allport 1954; Judd, Park, and Kintsch 1993)—it is possible for types to be completely unmoored from actual previous policy positions, though we find relatively little evidence of this in the results we report below.

3. Partisan types are thus somewhat different from the related concept of issue ownership, which refers to parties’ reputations for competence (Petrocik 1996) or for prioritizing a given issue (Egan 2013). Moreover, although the party brands literature has explored issue ownership in the context of foreign policy, it has tended to reduce foreign policy to national security—an issue on which Republicans are generally more trusted (Gadarian 2010)—rather than exploring a richer array of foreign policy questions.

4. As Taylor (1981, 83) writes, “We do not stereotype a person, we stereotype a person-as-a-member-of-a-group.”
the domestic public, taking party reputations into account when evaluating the merits of a policy proposal (Saunders 2018).

**Partisan types in foreign policy**

Perhaps the most prominent research tradition that assumes the existence of distinct partisan types in foreign affairs involves the domestic politics of signaling. A voluminous body of scholarship has emerged in recent years exploring the informative value of actors going against type in order to send credible signals (Fehrs 2014; Kane and Norpoth 2017; Kreps et al. 2018; Mattes and Weeks 2019a; Saunders 2018; Schultz 2005; Trager and Vavreck 2011). At their most general level, the logic of these models is relatively straightforward: an actor (the “receiver”) is uncertain about the merits or outcome of a potential policy being recommended by another actor (the “sender”) and thus relies on knowledge it has about the sender in order to evaluate the credibility of its claims.5 Whether because we are particularly attentive to incongruent or surprising information (Maheswaran and Chaiken 1991) or because of the inherent value of costly signals over cheap talk (Schelling 1960), signals are stronger if they come from unlikely or biased sources, who thus may give the most credible advice (Calvert 1985; Kydd 2003). If even the Pentagon says defense spending is too high, defense spending should likely be cut (Krehbiel 1991); if even the United Nations approves of a military intervention, the intervener’s intentions are likely good (Chapman 2011; Thompson 2009); if even Fox News praises a Democratic policy, it is probably meritorious (Baum and Groeling 2009); and so on. Leaders whose support of a policy goes against type are thus more persuasive (Cukierman and Tommasi 1998; Schultz 2005). While some variants of these models focus on types at the leader level—as with the adage that only Nixon can go to China—many others rely on types at the party level because of the extent to which party brands are “one of the most accessible and information-rich political cues available to voters” (Trager and Vavreck 2011, 531). In other words, if Democrats and Republicans are perceived as having distinct types on foreign policy issues in the eyes of the public, they are able to signal credibly to domestic constituents on these issues through a channel that is curtailed if the two parties’ types are indistinguishable; there are limited political gains to be had from going “against type” on an issue where your party is not seen as having a distinct type in the first place.

The strength of partisan types in foreign policy also has important implications for questions about bipartisanship in foreign policy (e.g., Bafumi and Parent 2012; Busby and Monten 2008; Chaudoin et al. 2010; Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007). If public opinion in foreign policy is shaped by elite cues—particularly the presence of elite consensus or polarization (Baum and Groeling 2009; Saunders 2015; Zaller 1992, though see Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017)—and the public sees partisan elites as espousing fairly similar foreign policy views, this likely creates a natural limit on how far public attitudes can veer away from the center. In contrast, if there are, in fact, strong partisan types in foreign policy, this creates the potential for a vicious cycle, as a progressively larger cleavage emerges between the foreign policy views of the supporters of the two parties. For one thing, if the public perceives party elites as differing greatly on foreign policy issues, then public attitudes are likely to follow and become more polarized. In turn, if party elites see their base supporters as shifting away from the center on foreign policy issues, they have incentives to follow suit, which would likely prompt the partisan supporters in the public to shift further from the center, thereby furthering the cycle.

It also has ramifications for the study of public opinion about foreign policy more broadly. In a variety of research traditions, ranging from the “spiral of silence” model in political communication (Noelle-Neumann 1974) to “impersonal influence” models in political science (Mutz 1998), partisan types matter because they act as social norms, which help structure political behavior: what people think other group members think significantly affects their own preferences and behavior (Asch 1956; Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017; Mendelberg 2002; Mutz 1998). As a result, the perceived distinctiveness of partisan types has important implications for many of the central questions in the study of public opinion, from the strength of elite cues, to the degree of polarization, to the extent of partisan-motivated reasoning, to the collective rationality of the public more generally. When partisan types are stronger, elite cues are easier for the public to follow (Levendusky 2010) and the public becomes more polarized along party lines in its own preferences—which is why correcting misperceptions about polarization causes the public to express more moderate views (Ahler 2014). Because strong partisan types cause specific policy stances to be seen as a “badge of membership within identity-defining affinity groups,” citizens presented with them are more likely to engage in partisan-motivated reasoning (Kahan 2016, 2), causing them to express more certainty.

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5. In this sense, these models simultaneously assume both the presence and absence of uncertainty: the legislator is both uncertain about the outcome of a policy and certain about the bias of her advisors (e.g., Calvert 1985); the public is uncertain about the merits of a policy, but knows (or at least has a rough estimate of) the ideal point of the cue giver (e.g., Chapman 2011).
about their opinions and engage in the various biases that follow from it (Bolsen et al. 2014). Finally, the accuracy of partisan types is another means of assessing the competence of the public in foreign policy more generally (Jentleson 1992; Kertzer and Zeitoff 2017). We know the American public does not know very much about foreign policy issues, which are generally far removed from most Americans’ daily lives (Guisinger 2009; Kertzer 2013). If the partisan stereotypes that the public holds about Democrats and Republicans in foreign affairs bear no resemblance to actual partisan preferences, it raises further questions about the extent to which the public can be trusted to espouse judgments in foreign policy issues.

Although our primary focus here is on partisan types as perceived by domestic audiences, a variety of theoretical models in IR argue that partisan stereotypes also travel abroad, especially in regards to hawkishness. For example, Prins (2001, 431) finds that Democratic administrations are more likely to be targeted in militarized disputes than Republican administrations are because foreign audiences perceive Democrats to be doves eager to compromise; Foster (2008) and Clark and colleagues (2011) suggest that foreign leaders are likely to stay out of the United States’ way when Republicans are in charge, but are likely to exploit the United States when Democrats are in power. If one party is seen by foreign observers as systematically more hawkish than the other, the rate at which the United States is targeted or exploited in disputes or has its concessions reciprocated in negotiations (Clare 2014; Mattes and Weeks 2019b) should vary based on which party is in power.

Yet despite the wide range of literatures that invoke assumptions about strong partisan types in foreign affairs, there are also some reasons for skepticism. First, the partisan types literature in IR is at odds with an older body of work on public opinion in foreign policy, which traditionally thought of foreign affairs as a domain in which there was relative bipartisan agreement, both among political elites and within the public at large (Gowa 1998; Schlesinger Jr. 1949). Public opinion scholars like Holsti and Rosenau (1990) and Wittkopf (1990) turned to foreign policy orientations like “militant internationalism” and “cooperative internationalism” to explain foreign policy attitudes precisely because conventional political variables like partisanship explained relatively little of the variance in either elites’ or the mass public’s foreign policy views. The era of Scoop Jackson and Nelson Rockefeller has long passed, but the mainstream foreign policy establishment in Washington remains sufficiently congealed that it is frequently referred to as “the Blob.” Historically, the two parties have been equally prone to using force in the militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) data (Palmer et al. 2015), for example, Democrats are no less likely to initiate fatal MIDs than Republicans. Of the 11 preferential trade agreements entered into between 2001 and 2016, for example, 8 passed along bi- or cross-partisan lines (Kucik and Mora-guez 2016). Many of the fiercest debates in foreign policy occur within parties rather than between them, as foreign policy is often characterized by cross-partisan “Baptist-bootlegger” coalitions in both security (e.g., liberal internationalists and neoconservatives joining forces to support military interventions) and in economics (e.g., both the critical left and the nationalist right opposing free trade and globalization).

As a result, even though the two parties often adopt different stances on specific issues (e.g., Democrats were more favorable toward the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran; Republicans were more favorable toward the 2017 immigration travel ban), contemporary public opinion data often show a fair amount of bipartisan consensus about more general foreign policy goals, as recent survey data from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2016) make clear. In other words, if partisan types accurately reflect either the historical record or the degree of political polarization on various issues, it is not immediately clear how distinctive partisan types should be across the board in foreign affairs.

A second reason for skepticism lies within the public itself: even if the parties were fundamentally distinct on foreign policy issues, is the public as a whole sufficiently sophisticated to perceive these distinctions given how far removed foreign policy issues are for many members of the American public? Formal models of against-type dynamics were originally developed in legislative signaling games, where it was reasonable to treat types as common knowledge, since the types in question are relatively well defined—both because of the nature of the senders (e.g., legislative committees, specialized by design) and the sophistication of the receivers (e.g., legislators; Krehbiel 1991). It is unclear how well these models translate to the context of public opinion about foreign policy, where sender preferences may be less distinct and the receiver much less knowledgeable (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).

Much of the work that implicates distinct partisan types on foreign policy issues is formal rather than empirical or never directly measures the contents of audiences’ second-order beliefs. As a result, despite the popularity and significance of the concept, we actually know relatively little about which foreign policy issues have distinct partisan types.

6. The same conclusions also hold in the international crisis behavior (ICB) data and militarized compellent threat (MCT) data.
OPERATIONALIZING PARTISAN TYPES

Although there are a number of different ways to study beliefs about the policy preferences of Republicans and Democrats (e.g., Ahler 2014; Brady and Sniderman 1985; Goggin et al. 2020; Levendusky and Malhotra 2016), we focus below on two properties of partisan types that are particularly useful for our purposes.

First, partisan types have content. The literature on stereotype content in psychology is vast (for a summary, see Fiske et al. 2002; Hilton and von Hippel 1996; Stagner and Lange 1994), but for our purposes, we might think simply of the content of a partisan type as the policies associated with a particular party. Based on the discussion above, one might associate hawkishness and unilateralism with the Republican party, for example, and dovishness and multilateralism with the Democratic party.

Second, partisan types vary in their intensity based on whether a policy proposal is highly or only weakly associated with a particular party. We care about the intensity of partisan types because it provides another way of speaking to their power, and thus to how much traction a political leader can derive from going against type. For example, the relationship between unilateralism and the Republican party might be seen as weaker than the relationship between the Republican party and opposition to abortion; the signaling gains from going against type would therefore be larger in the latter case than the former, since a leader is unlikely to procure much political advantage from going against a policy position that is only weakly associated with the party.

To make the discussion more concrete, suppose $n$ members of the public are given a set of $j$ different policy proposals. For each policy, respondents are asked to imagine that leaders from a political party were taking the issue position being presented and to indicate which party they would guess was the one taking the position, with response options forming a five-point scale ranging from “Definitely Democratic” to “Definitely Republican.” A neutral scale midpoint allows for the possible absence of distinctive types, producing the raw distributions in figure 1.

First, we can simply look at the content of each partisan type: on average, which party is associated with each policy? We can measure stereotype content using the arithmetic mean $(\bar{x} = (1/n)\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i)$. Thus, policy A in figure 1 has a relatively Republican stereotype $(\bar{x}_A = 0.71)$ and policy C a relatively Democratic one $(\bar{x}_C = 0.25)$, while policy B suggests a relatively indistinct type close to the scale midpoint $(\bar{x}_B = 0.49)$.

Second, we can look at the intensity of each partisan type: on average, how intense is the stereotype? Is the policy strongly associated with a given party or only weakly associated? We can measure stereotype intensity by recentering the scale along its midpoint and taking the mean of the absolute value $(|z| = (1/n)\sum_{i=1}^{n} |z_i|, z_i = x_i - 0.5)$. Thus, although the stereotype content measures for policies A and C are diametrically opposed, their intensity measures are similar $(|z_A| = 0.65, |z_C| = 0.63)$; as measured by stereotype intensity, these two policies are closer to one another than they are to policy B, whose intensity measure is weaker $(|z_B| = 0.34)$.

Each of these measures thus captures something subtly different: content tells us what parties a policy is associated with and intensity tells us the strength of the association. These measures are deliberately simple, and there are, of course, countless other ways to characterize partisan types; in appendix section 2.2 (the appendix is available online), we present a variety of other measures of stereotypicality (including measures of content and intensity that omit or disaggregate the “both” and “neither” categories, a prevalence measure that captures how frequently a policy is associated with parties in general, and Euclidean-distance-based measures of stereotypicality that measure the degree of dissimilarity between the observed distribution and two different null distributions), but overall these alternate measures produce similar results to the simplified measures used above. Our claim, then, is not that these are the only ways to operationalize partisan types, but rather that they constitute two simple measures that are likely intuitive to many political scientists. In the next section, we use these measures to map the topography of partisan types in foreign policy.

METHOD

To offer what we believe to be the first systematic analysis of partisan types in foreign policy, we fielded two original survey experiments on national samples of American adults by Dynata (formerly known as Survey Sampling International). The first was fielded on a national sample of 1,016 American adults in August 2014; the second was fielded on a national sample of 1,005 American adults in December 2018.7 In each study, the main survey instrument consisted of two questionnaires.

At the beginning of the first questionnaire, participants were instructed: “For the first set of questions, we’re going to present you with a series of policy proposals. Please indicate the degree of support you would feel towards the...

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7. This measure is thus akin to measures of attitude extremity (Miller and Peterson 2004), in that it focuses on the strengths of the associations made, rather than its direction.

8. See app. sec. 1.3 for further discussion of the sample.
proposed policies if politicians in the US took each position.” Participants were then presented with a list of 12 policy proposals covering a mix of domestic and foreign political issues (discussed in greater detail below and presented in full in app. sec. 1.1). For each proposal, participants indicated their degree of support on a Likert response scale ranging from 1 (extremely unsupportive) to 7 (extremely supportive).9

After participants completed the questionnaire indicating their support for each proposal, they then were presented with a second questionnaire, in which they were instructed:

Now, we would like for you to think about these issues in a different way.

If you heard that leaders from a political party were taking the issue positions described below, which party would you guess was probably the one taking that position?

Participants were then presented the same 12 policy proposals as before, but this time, they were asked to indicate which party was more likely to be the one taking that position, using the response options “Definitely Democratic leaders,” “Probably Democratic leaders,” “Probably Republican leaders,” “Definitely Republican leaders,” “Both Democrats and Republicans,” and “Neither Democrats nor Republicans.” Thus, whereas the first questionnaire measures participants’ own feelings toward these proposals, the second uses these proposals to tap into the partisan stereotypes participants hold about each of the two major political parties. Finally, participants completed a short demographic questionnaire.

Although the layout of the survey was relatively straightforward from the perspective of the participants, it contained a relatively complex randomization protocol. First, to avoid potential order effects, we randomized the order in which each of the policy proposals were presented in each questionnaire. Second, for eight of the policy issues (listed in full in table 1 in app. sec. 1.1), we randomly varied the content of each proposal: for trade policy, for example, half of the participants were presented with a protectionist policy proposal and the other half with a free trade policy proposal. This technique not only avoids conflating partisan types with issue ownership, but allows us to study a wide variety of policy proposals without inducing concerns about respondent fatigue or the demand effects that would likely arise if each respondent were evaluating multiple policy proposals on the same issue. This randomization carried over across both questionnaires, so participants who were given a protectionist proposal in the first questionnaire, for example, were also given a protectionist proposal in the second.

Third, because it is possible that partisan types manifest themselves not with the goal of a policy, but with the tactics, for four of the foreign policy proposals (listed in full in table 2 in app. sec. 1.1), we held the purpose of each policy

9. In app. sec. 2.4, we test for and find little evidence of order effects.

Figure 1. Exploring different measures of partisan type. Each panel displays the raw distributions of responses for three policy proposals in which respondents are asked to assess whether a policy is definitely Democratic, probably Democratic, probably Republican, definitely Republican, or could be linked to either (or neither) party, which serves as the scale midpoint. Although policies A and C indicate stereotypes with very different contents (policy A is associated with Republicans (\(\pi_A = 0.71\)) and policy C with Democrats (\(\pi_C = 0.25\))), the intensity of each measure is relatively similar (\(|z_A| = 0.65, |z_C| = 0.63\)). In contrast, policy B has a relatively indistinct type (\(\pi_B = 0.49\)) close to the scale midpoint, which is therefore also relatively low in intensity (\(|z_B| = 0.34\)). The distributions come from real data from study 1; see app. sec. 2.1 for the distributions for all 51 policy proposals from the two studies.
fixed, but varied the approach: namely, whether the policy was conducted multilaterally or unilaterally. Here, we employed a nested randomization structure. One-third of participants were assigned to a pure control condition, in which, for each of these four policies, we only presented the central purpose of the policy, but did not mention how it would be conducted. For the remaining two-thirds of participants, respondents were randomly presented with either a unilateral or a multilateral version of each policy; each approach was randomized at the item level, such that some participants were in the multilateral condition for some policies and the unilateral condition for others.10 Because random assignment allowed for different participants to evaluate different versions of each policy, study 1 obtains results for 28 different policy statements in total.

Study 2 has a format identical to its predecessor, but includes a slightly different set of 23 policy proposals (listed in app. sec. 1.2), some of which had also been administered in the previous study. In this manner, the two surveys therefore obtain results for 51 policy statements altogether, representing 32 unique policies. Although the list of policies covered here is obviously not exhaustive, it nonetheless reflects a wide range of domestic and foreign policy issues, from economic issues to social ones, from general foreign policy predilections to specific foreign policy interventions. This breadth not only bolsters the generalizability of our results, but also enables us to test whether participants espouse systematically different partisan types in domestic issues than in foreign policy ones and also to test how these partisan types change over time.

RESULTS: WHAT DO PARTISAN TYPES LOOK LIKE IN FOREIGN POLICY?

We present our initial results in three stages. First, we look at stereotype content, showing that the average types assigned to foreign policy issues tend to be less stark than for domestic political issues, although some crossover issues display more distinct types. Second, we look at stereotype intensity, showing that partisan types in foreign affairs are generally perceived as relatively less intense than their domestic counterparts. Finally, we model variations in stereotype intensity in a multivariate context, estimating a series of mixed-effect models that suggest that there is an impressive amount of congruence between the partisan stereotypes Americans hold and the actual distributions of partisan support: partisan stereotypes are more intense on issues where the policy preferences of Republicans and Democrats differ the most. We obtain similar results longitudinally as well, showing that changes in stereotype content between 2014 and 2018 closely track with actual changes in the partisan composition of these policies’ support during this period: the correlation between changes in stereotype content and partisan changes in policy preferences is very high ($r = 0.85$). Based on these results, it appears the relative weakness of partisan types results not from the public’s ignorance, but from partisan types generally being less distinctive than political scientists often assume.

Stereotype content

Figures 2 and 3 present the average stereotype content of each of our 51 policy proposals from the two studies, with 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals derived from $B = 1,500$ bootstraps. In addition to the point estimates, the figures include light grey lines connecting each pair of treatments (or triad of treatments, for the foreign policy approach conditions) on a given issue. Thus, the longer the grey line, the more distinct the stereotypes and the greater the treatment effect of switching from one policy stance (e.g., interventionism) to another (e.g., isolationism). The figures show that the magnitude of the differences in stereotype content between policy pairs varies dramatically across issues. In both studies, domestic issues display a large and intuitive symmetry between opposing policy proposals: for example, a pro-choice policy has a relatively Democratic type ($\bar{x} = 0.25$ in 2014, $\bar{x} = 0.27$ in 2018), while an antiabortion policy has a relatively Republican one ($\bar{x} = 0.71$ in 2014, $\bar{x} = 0.72$ in 2018), such that the treatment effect for switching stances on abortion is extremely large (a 46 or 44 percentage point change in the stereotype content scale, respectively). This is consistent with other domestic issues as well; of the domestic political issues in each study, the average size of the treatment effects of switching from one stance to another on stereotype content is 40 percentage points in 2014 and 37 percentage points in 2018.

Of the foreign policy issues in the middle panels of figures 2 and 3, we see considerable variation across both issues and time. The foreign policy issue where we observe the most distinct partisan types is immigration, which is frequently understood as a crossover issue bridging the divide between domestic politics and foreign policy (e.g., Coleman 2008) and features a 32 percentage point treatment effect, consistent with the salience of the issue in both the 2016 presidential campaign and 2018 midterm election. Partisan types on military spending are also relatively distinct in both years (a 30 percentage point treatment effect in 2014 and a 24 percentage point treatment effect in 2018). Yet for other foreign policy issues—particularly those most squarely in the realm of foreign affairs—partisan types become less distinct: the treatment effect for arms control is 14 percentage

10. In this manner, we avoid potential contamination effects that would result if the pure control was also assigned at the item level.
points in 2014, which shrinks to 9 percentage points in 2018. Interestingly, Democrats are seen as slightly more dovish than Republicans, but the effect size pales in comparison with the domestic political issues we present here.

We see particularly striking effects for trade and isolationism. In 2014, the two parties were perceived as relatively similar on both issues: switching from a protectionist stance to a free trade stance produced a treatment effect of only 3 percentage points, while switching from an isolationist stance to an interventionist stance produced a treatment effect of only 1 percentage point. A different pattern of results emerged in 2018. In the intervening four years, Donald Trump made opposition to free trade deals like the North American Free Trade Agreement and an inward-looking foreign policy major tenets of his 2016 presidential election campaign, as well as his policy agenda once in office. As a result, we see partisan types on trade and isolationism become more distinct in our 2018 study: switching from protectionism to free trade then caused a 13 percentage point treatment effect and isolationism to interventionism a 10 percentage point treatment effect. Yet despite the centrality of these issues, it is striking how much less distinct these partisan stereotypes remain when compared to the domestic issues under consideration: in 2018, the treatment effects for isolationism are 30% the size of the treatment effect for taxes or 27% of the size of treatment effects for gun control, for example. Even during the Trump presidency, the content of partisan types was notably less distinct for many foreign policy issues.

Foreign policy approaches—whether an intervention is conducted multilaterally or unilaterally—display extremely small treatment effects (averaging 3 percentage points in each study); there is some indication that unilateral missions are more strongly associated with the Republican party, but
not consistently so, and the effect sizes are modest; the principal policy objective (Jentleson 1992) matters more for stereotype content than the approach itself.

These stereotype content findings reveal a number of key patterns. First, we find significant variation in the distinctiveness of partisan types across different types of issues. Domestic political issues tend to display relatively stark partisan types, while foreign affairs issues (including interventionism, multilateralism, and trade) generally do not. However, partisan types do not stop at the water’s edge altogether: the two parties are seen as clearly distinct in some crossover issues, especially defense spending or immigration in 2018.

**Stereotype intensity**

Figure 4 presents the intensity of partisan types, which measure the strength of the association respondents perceive between each policy proposal and the political parties. Here, our interest is less in the treatment effects of contradictory policy stances (which should exert an impact on stereotype content, rather than stereotype intensity, since it focuses on the extremity of the stereotype, rather than its direction) and more on the average stereotype intensity for each policy issue. As the plot suggests, domestic political issues are seen as displaying significantly more intense partisan types than foreign policy issues are, with the exception of military spending (in 2014) or immigration (in 2018).

As with the stereotype content results, then, these findings should reassure those scholars concerned about the potential collapse of bipartisanship in foreign policy. At the same time, they also suggest some important scope conditions for signaling models relying on partisan types in foreign policy: if the two parties have relatively weak partisan types on foreign policy issues like multilateralism, interventionism, arms control, and trade, it suggests leaders should gain less advantage from going against their party’s type on those issues than on others like military spending or immigration.
Assessing the accuracy of partisan types. If partisan types are social facts, the question of their objective accuracy is a secondary one, since socially shared beliefs can have real consequences regardless of their veracity (Searle 1995). For party-based “against-type” effects to be substantively strong in foreign affairs, for example, it matters less how objectively distinct the two parties are from one another and more how distinct the parties are perceived to be by the domestic audience. Nonetheless, the question of accuracy suggests two diametrically opposed interpretations of the findings presented above. The first is that the generally weak findings for partisan types in foreign policy simply show how ignorant or inattentive the public is about world affairs: although political scientists may know that Republicans are from Mars and
Democrats are from Venus, the public itself may be too disconnected to recognize these clear partisan gaps (e.g., Guisinger 2009; Kertzer 2013). A very different interpretation is that the weakness of partisan types in foreign policy is not an indictment of the public, but rather approximates the actual degree of ideological differences between the two parties on foreign policy issues.

There are two types of benchmarks one can use to measure stereotype accuracy. The first is attitudinal: assessing the congruence between participants’ second-order beliefs and their first-order preferences, thereby testing whether the issues where respondents perceive the greatest partisan gaps are the issues where the gaps themselves are the greatest. The second is behavioral: analyzing the historical record and assessing how differently the two parties have behaved when in office. Given space constraints and the sheer number of issues examined in the experimental design, it is well beyond the scope of this article to offer a systematic behavioral test. Instead, we offer a set of four attitudinal tests: (a) studying the individual- and issue-level correlates of stereotype intensity in our data using a set of linear mixed models, (b) assessing the accuracy of respondents’ second-order beliefs by analyzing the relationship between issue-level polarization and stereotype intensity, (c) investigating whether the partisan-type gap between domestic and foreign issues shrinks among more politically sophisticated respondents, and (d) examining the strength of the relationship between changes in stereotype content between 2014 and 2018 and actual changes in partisan preferences during this same period.

These tests have important implications both positively and normatively. If issue-level polarization is strongly correlated with stereotype intensity, and changes in partisan stereotypes over time are strongly correlated with actual changes in partisan preferences, it suggests our respondents’ stereotypes about Republicans and Democrats in foreign affairs largely track with what Republicans and Democrats in the mass public actually think. Moreover, if more politically sophisticated respondents—who tend to be more ideological and more likely to receive cues from elites (Zaller 1992)—are no less likely to perceive a stereotype intensity gap between foreign and domestic policy issues than their less sophisticated counterparts, it suggests that this gap is less likely to be a result of mass ignorance.

To differentiate between these alternate interpretations, we estimate a series of linear mixed-effect models in table 1. The first model in table 1 estimates a simple one-way analysis of variance, simply partitioning the variance in the responses to determine how much of the variation in stereotype intensity can be attributed to characteristics of respondents, rather than characteristics of the policy proposals themselves. Consistent with other work emphasizing the considerable heterogeneity of the public (e.g., Kertzer 2013), an analysis of the intraclass correlation ($\rho = 4.55$) finds that there is over four times as much variation in the data among respondents than among issues, thereby reinforcing the importance of incorporating respondent-level predictors to explain this variation theoretically.

Thus, the second model in table 1 adds a series of individual-level covariates: respondents’ age, gender, income, race, education, partisanship, and interest in politics (all of which are described in greater detail in app. sec. 1.1). The results show that, on average, more educated respondents (who are more likely to be politically sophisticated) tend to report stronger stereotypes than less educated ones; the same pattern is also detected with measures of self-reported interest in politics. Male respondents tend to provide slightly stronger stereotypes than female ones, and younger respondents tend to report slightly weaker stereotypes than older ones, although supplementary analysis in appendix section 2.5 finds no evidence of cohort effects using generalized additive models to account for potential nonlinearities in the effects of age. The third model in table 1 finds the same pattern of results, this time also including a measure of the strength of participants’ own preferences on the particular policy proposal. The results show that the stronger participants themselves feel about a policy proposal, the stronger a partisan type they attribute to it.

The fourth model in table 1 adds our first issue-level predictor: a dichotomous variable for whether the issue is a foreign policy issue or not. Corroborating our earlier findings, foreign policy issues feature approximately 19% lower levels of stereotype intensity than domestic issues. Finally, the fifth model adds a measure of how polarized the respondents themselves were on party lines about each of the $j$ policy statements we surveyed here, calculating polarization by estimating the absolute value of the difference between Republicans’ and Democrats’ average level of support for each policy proposal ($|\bar{p}_{Rj} - \bar{p}_{Dj}|$). Including a polarization measure as an issue-level predictor in the hierarchical model provides a means of investigating how accurate these partisan types are, telling us the extent to which variation in stereotypicality maps onto actual variation in partisan polarization among our respondents. Importantly, the effect of

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11. In app. sec. 2.3, we also replicate the results with an ordinal cumulative link mixed model to take the ordinal structure of the data into account, showing our results hold either way.

12. In app. sec. 2.4, we conduct robustness tests to suggest that this association is not attributable to order-induced priming effects.
the polarization measure is both substantively large and statistically significant: moving from the least to the most polarized issue among our respondents is associated with a 16% increase in stereotypicality. In other words, Americans see less distinct partisan types in foreign policy issues because their peers display less distinct partisan types in foreign policy issues. In this sense, on average, the stereotypes Americans believe about the policy preferences of partisans are relatively accurate.

A series of supplementary analyses in appendix section 2.3 offer further support for this interpretation. First, we replicate the fourth model in table 1, this time including an interaction term between the foreign policy issue variable and participants’ level of education. We also estimate another version of this same model, this time interacting the foreign policy issue variable with participants’ level of interest in politics. In both models, the interaction term is statistically significant and negative: more politically sophisticated participants assign relatively weaker types to foreign policy issues than domestic political ones, rather than stronger ones. The more educated or politically engaged participants are, the more they know that foreign policy issues display relatively weaker types, perhaps because they have a better sense of the partisan landscape. Similarly, when we replicate the fifth model from table 1, but this time interacting the polarization variable with political interest or education, the interactions are positive and significant, reconfirming that more politically sophisticated respondents more accurately gauge how Republicans and Democrats think.

Finally, we exploit the fact that 19 of the 32 unique policy proposals were fielded in both the 2014 and 2018 surveys, which lets us test whether the issues in which Republicans and Democrats’ policy preferences changed the most in this period are the issues about which partisan types changed the most as well. Figure 5 presents a scatterplot in which the X-axis is the difference-in-difference between Republicans and Democrats’ policy preferences between 2018 and 2014 ($p_{2014,R} - p_{2014,D}$) — ($p_{2018,R} - p_{2018,D}$)): the further to the right

### Table 1. Linear Mixed Models: Respondent-Level and Issue-Level Correlates of Stereotype Intensity

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Note. All models include random effects for respondents, issues, and years. BIC = Bayesian information criterion. Standard errors in parentheses. See app. sec. 2.3 for results from an ordinal mixed model.

* $p < .1$.

** $p < .05$.

*** $p < .01$. 

1776 / Do Partisan Types Stop at the Water’s Edge? Joshua D. Kertzer, Deborah Jordan Brooks, and Stephen G. Brooks
an issue proposal is located on the X-axis, the more Republicans increased in their favorability of the issue proposal over time compared to Democrats. The Y-axis measures $\bar{x}_{2018} - \bar{x}_{2014}$, the change in stereotype content over time: the higher the value, the more Republican the partisan type became.

Two points are evident here. First, most of the policy proposals we examined cluster near the (0, 0) point, indicating they were fairly stable over time—both in terms of the actual partisan composition of their bases of support and in the partisan stereotypes respondents had about who the supporters of these policies were. Despite popular commentary emphasizing the extent to which the rise of Trump has corresponded with a fundamental transformation of American foreign policy preferences, these effects appear relatively limited for most issues. Yet some issues show large changes. Raising taxes on the wealthy, for example, was seen as a starkly Democratic policy in 2014, but by 2018 was seen as a policy that members of both parties might be willing to support. In the context of foreign affairs, protectionism and isolationism were seen as much more Republican in 2018 than they were in 2014.

Second, and importantly, the correlation between partisan changes in policy preferences and changes in stereotype content is extremely high ($r = 0.85$): the more Republicans support a particular policy over time, the more Republican
the partisan type becomes. This longitudinal pattern nicely mirrors the cross-sectional pattern reported in the mixed effect models in table 1 linking actual levels of partisan polarization with stereotype intensity and offers further evidence of the collective rationality of the public. As figures 1 and 2 in appendix section 2.1 show, individually, many Americans get these stereotypes wrong; on average, however, they characterize the partisan distribution of opinion on both domestic and foreign policy issues relatively well.

**DISCUSSION**

Our findings raise a number of important implications and areas for future research. First, we show systematic variation in the distinctiveness of partisan types across foreign policy issues: partisan types are relatively weak across many traditional foreign policy issues (e.g., arms control, interventionism, unilateralism, trade) while more distinct in those crossover foreign policy issues that relate most closely to domestic politics, like defense spending or immigration. Better understanding the origins of this variation is an important question for future work. Indeed, one of the virtues of our experimental design is that we focus on 32 different policies rather than just one or two, allowing us to detect variation that would otherwise be obscured. In this sense, although we examined a wide range of foreign policy issues in this study, it would obviously be valuable for future research to analyze additional issues.

It should also be noted that although partisan types are not particularly distinct in most foreign policy issues in the United States, the same may not be true elsewhere. It is therefore worth conducting similar studies in other countries. On the one hand, one consequence of America’s hegemonic role in the international system is that the left-wing party in the American party system is generally more hawkish and interventionist than left-wing parties in many other countries, such that partisan types in foreign affairs could likely be more distinct elsewhere. On the other hand, countries with fewer material capabilities also have less ability to carry out interventionist foreign policies, providing less of an opportunity for differentiation on at least some of these dimensions.

An additional interpretation might be that, although the results are mixed news for partisan types in IR, individual leaders can cultivate types of their own, such that they can choose to go against their own type rather than that of their party as a whole. Yet as noted above, this suggests important scope conditions for against-type models: to gain traction from going against type, one must have successfully built up a type in the first place. Indeed, the reason the American politics literature turned to “party brand” heuristics was precisely out of a concern that members of the mass public lack the time and capacity to discern individual candidates’ positions across every political issue. If leaders need to rely on personal types in order to leverage against type effects, for many political leaders, this should make going against type harder, rather than easier.

Although this article focused on partisan types in the eyes of the mass public, future scholarship should turn to elites, both in measuring their second-order beliefs about partisan preferences in foreign affairs and in exploring how they attempt to cultivate and maintain these types in the first place. This is particularly valuable because it is possible that partisan differences in foreign policy issues may be more pronounced among elites. At the same time, if these partisan differences really are so strong, and elite cue taking is as powerful as many scholars claim (Baum and Groeling 2009; Zaller 1992), it raises the question of why distinct partisan types among elites do not spill over into the masses. Moreover, the significant negative interaction terms between foreign policy issues and political interest and education we report here suggests that the citizens who should be the most likely to receive elite cues are also the least likely to see distinct foreign policy types.

Thinking about elite incentives, however, also raises a broader theoretical puzzle for future work. Most models of against-type behavior are one-shot games, where a receiver is uncertain about the quality of a policy, a sender provides a signal, the receiver updates based on the contents of the signal and its beliefs about the sender, and the receiver formulates support, whereupon the game ends. However, if leaders have an incentive to go against type in order to bolster support, and publics update their beliefs about the leader’s type over time, the long-run dynamics are worth exploring. Suppose a simple model featuring a politician trying to acquire the support of the median voter, who has beliefs (b) about the politician’s type that are common knowledge. In each iteration, the politician carries out a policy (xt, = 0, 1) designed to maximize the voter’s support (yt). If yt = f(xt, b), the politician should go against type by choosing the policy that maximizes the distance from b. If the process repeats, however, b should change over time, as the voter updates based on xt.

Although the setup is deliberately simple, the intuition it conveys is worth emphasizing. If parties begin with a distinct type, which gives them an incentive to go against type in order to bolster public support, and citizens update their assessments of type based on actual behavior, the advantages of going against type should narrow over time as parties’ types erode or even change. This is particularly relevant given the results from our data, which suggest that Trump has shifted the content of Republicans’ type on trade and isolationism. Akin to the parable of “the boy who cried wolf,” for against-type
effects to be powerful, they therefore must be used sparingly. “Sister Souljah moments” can only be momentary—as the “party trespassing” literature in American politics implies (Holian 2004; Norpoth and Buchanan 1992).

It is thus valuable for future work to consider modeling the long-run implications of against-type effects. This is also worth thinking about because historically, different presidents have approached their party’s type in foreign policy in very different ways. Nixon first built up—and then went against—his party’s type in traditional foreign policy issues in order to achieve his political goals, whereas Trump doubled down on Republicans’ foreign policy type on some issues (e.g., defense spending), but went against it in others (e.g., trade). This raises interesting questions about how presidents choose which partisan types to buttress and which ones to buck: given a wide range of foreign policy issues, which foreign policy types do presidents choose to double down on, and which ones do they choose to move away from? Do presidents get more credit for doing so with respect to certain kinds of foreign policy issues rather than others? It also raises important questions about the interdependence of partisan types across issue areas: Senator John McCain cultivated a reputation as a “maverick,” but did so largely by going against his party’s type on domestic issues rather than foreign ones; being consistent on the latter gave him more degrees of freedom with the former. Exploring questions such as these is an important area for future work.

CONCLUSION
As interest in the domestic politics of foreign policy grows, political scientists are increasingly interested in the role that partisan types held by the public—and parties’ ability to go against them—play in international affairs. Nevertheless, there has been surprisingly little empirical work that systematically examines partisan types in foreign policy. In this article, we fielded two survey experiments to explore the range of issues in which distinct partisan types exist and how they change over time. We find that partisan types vary considerably across different foreign policy issues, but are generally less distinct and less intense than in domestic political issues. Moreover, as we benchmark our findings against participants’ own partisan preferences, both cross-sectionally and longitudinally, our results suggest that this relative weakness of partisan types in foreign policy is not necessarily the result of the public’s ignorance, but rather because the degree of partisan polarization in the mass public on many foreign policy issues is perhaps less stark than many political scientists assume.

In this sense, our findings have implications for a range of questions about the nature of public opinion in both domestic and foreign policy issues. One of the traditional justifications for top-down theories of public opinion in IR was that the public’s general lack of knowledge about foreign policy should make it a domain where the public is especially reliant on cues from elites (Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017). Yet, if the two parties are perceived as less distinct in foreign issues than domestic ones, our findings suggest a range of foreign policy issues where elite cues may be relatively harder for the public to follow, leading the public to anchor many of its foreign policy views on other considerations instead, such as core values (Rathbun et al. 2016).

Similarly, the close correspondence between partisan stereotypes and the actual distribution of partisan support in our samples is consistent with a more optimistic wave of public opinion scholarship pointing to the public’s collective rationality. Just as the public’s aggregate foreign policy preferences seem to respond sensibly to world events (Page and Shapiro 1992), its second-order beliefs seem to respond sensibly to changes in partisan opinion. These findings thus challenge long-standing assumptions in American politics that the public is too ignorant about policy to have meaningful opinions or to characterize policy positions accurately (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964) or that point to the inaccuracy of the public’s second-order beliefs (Ahler 2014; Levendusky and Malhotra 2016).

Our results also have important ramifications for the large literature that examines the prospect of bipartisanship in foreign policy. Many studies outline reasons why bipartisanship is now likely to be elusive in foreign policy making (e.g., Bafumi and Parent 2012; Busby and Monten 2008; Hurst 2014; Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007; Mellow 2011; Musgrave 2019; Snyder, Shapiro, and Bloch-Elkon 2009). Our study offers support for the alternative position in this debate by Chaudoin and colleagues (2010) and Busby and colleagues (2013) that foreign policy polarization in the mass public is likely less extreme than some critics allege.

They also have important implications for against-type models that are rapidly proliferating in the field. Our results suggest that political elites seeking to bolster support from the mass public by going against their partisan type are perhaps more limited in the range of foreign policy issues in which they can do so than many IR scholars realize. Given that against-type models were imported into IR from domains where types were extremely well defined (e.g., legislative politics, where a bureaucracy’s position on its own issue area is abundantly clear), our findings suggest caution in whether the assumptions that motivate these signaling models so well in other domains are present in foreign policy. Recent experimental work has found support for against-type models in IR (e.g., Mattes and Weeks 2019a; Saunders 2018) using
hypothesised vignettes that explicitly define the sender’s type on participants’ behalf, thereby bracketing the role of prior beliefs. Our findings suggest these beliefs are worthy of study in their own right as well.

Our findings have important implications for the study of interstate conflict more generally. Although our focus here was on partisan types in the eyes of domestic audiences, IR scholars often argue that foreign audiences perceive these distinctions as well, affecting the likelihood of Democratic and Republican administrations being targeted in disputes or having their threats or concessions reciprocated (e.g., Clare 2014; Foster 2008; Koch and Cranmer 2007; Prins 2001). The strategic conflict avoidance literature, for example, argues that foreign leaders are more likely to stay out of the way when Republicans are in power, but target the United States when Democrats are in charge, precisely because the latter’s constituents are seen as significantly more dovish than the former (Clark et al. 2011; see also Williams 2014). Our results here raise interesting questions about the microfoundations of these findings. If Americans perceive partisan types as being relatively weak and indistinct in foreign affairs, and these stereotypes closely mirror the actual topography of partisan support, why would partisan types be perceived as so stark by foreign audiences?

One interpretation is that our findings are simply an artifact of the contemporary political environment, such that partisan types were more distinct in the past in foreign policy issues in the United States than they are today. In this case, though, this would suggest the interstate conflict literature’s findings are similarly time bound: which party occupies the White House should no longer affect foreign leaders’ assessments of American resolve or credibility. Another interpretation is that foreign audiences’ stereotypes about partisan beliefs are less accurate than domestic perceptions of partisan types are, raising interesting questions about where these stereotypes come from and how long they persist. Given the extent to which the Democratic party has traditionally been more centrist on foreign policy issues than many left-wing parties in other countries, one possibility is that foreign observers perceive left- and right-wing parties in other countries through the prism of party brands in one’s own country or that national stereotypes or embedded images condition the effects of party stereotypes, just as party stereotypes condition the effects of gender stereotypes, for example (Hayes 2011). Either way, these findings suggest the merits of turning to experimental methods to test these microfoundational assumptions about audiences’ beliefs directly (Kertzer 2017). Doing so enriches our understanding of the interactions between domestic politics and international affairs.

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