

BLACK AND WHITE BEYOND THE WATER’S EDGE:
Supplementary Appendix

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A The public opinion dataset

We base our analysis on twelve waves of public opinion surveys fielded on nationally representative samples of the American public from 1975–2018 by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA). The original corpus, assembled by [Kertzer \(2022\)](#), consists of 1,504 individually-matched foreign policy questions fielded on paired surveys of nationally representative samples of the American public, on the one hand, and samples of foreign policy opinion leaders, on the other, over twelve different waves from 1975–2018.¹ Because of how few Black respondents there are in the elite samples (in most of the years, racial demographic variables were not even included in the elite surveys), the elite data is not useful for our purposes, but the public data is ideally suited. The public data contain 20,479 respondents; because of our specific interest in studying racial gaps in foreign policy attitudes between Black and White Americans, we remove 1,904 respondents from the data who do not identify with one of these two racial groups, leaving 1,975 Black and 16,511 White respondents.

Consistent with changing understandings of race in America, racial identification is measured in different ways in the history of the CCGA studies. In the early studies, survey interviewers classified respondents’ race themselves (using a relatively limited set of options), rather than asking respondents how they identified. In later studies, respondents were asked how they self-identified, and there were separate questions measuring race and ethnicity. To maximize comparability across different years of the survey, we thereby utilize the least complicated empirical strategy possible, and simply code as Black any individual for whom the Black or African-American response options were selected, and code as White any individual for whom the White response option was selected. As a result, the coding schemes available in the CCGA do not allow us to consistently distinguish complex identities, such as biracial identities. Given that biracial individuals often exhibit unique political attitudes ([Davenport, 2016](#); [Davenport, Iyengar and Westwood, 2022](#)), we see this as an important question that should be addressed by future work. Although we see these surveys as unusually comprehensive in the foreign policy domain given their temporal spread and topical breadth, they inevitably are not exhaustive, and future work should extend the analysis here with other data sources.

¹The corpus includes all foreign policy attitude questions from these surveys fielded on both elite and mass samples that also feature ordinal response options. See [Kertzer \(2020, 2022\)](#) for further details.

A.1 Coding variables in the dataset

Variables in the dataset were coded according to several different levels of classification. At the most granular level, questions were classified into twenty-nine specific foreign policy issues (e.g. the use of force, trade, democracy promotion, etc.). At the highest level, questions were classified into four theoretical touchpoints (e.g. skepticism about the use of state power, equitable access to resources, etc.). We also coded questions based on their question format (e.g. threat perception, vital interests to the United States, etc.), regional focus (e.g. Africa, Asia, etc.), and thematic category (e.g. security, economics, etc.). In the discussion below, we begin by discussing the coding methodology and rationale for the directional analysis in the paper (which focuses on the twenty-four of the specific foreign policy issues that ran directionally while grouped into the four touchpoints). We then turn to the methodology used for the absolute gap analysis in the paper (which utilizes a more expansive set of questions and classification schemes).

A.1.1 Coding for directional analyses

In our first round of coding, we identified twenty-nine specific foreign policy issues that ran directionally and repeated multiple times in the data; twenty-four of them fit into our four key touchpoint themes.² A total of 815 of the 1,504 questions in the dataset were both directional in nature and relevant to one of our twenty-four issues. Our process for linking each of the twenty-four issues to the four touchpoints is detailed below.

The “rights and freedoms” touchpoint is meant to aggregate questions that touch on political – and often legally established—rights, as well as a Rawlsian set of freedoms and liberties like the freedoms of expression and assembly. Generally speaking, we aimed to include questions in this category that emphasized the liberalism-illiberalism spectrum or that evoked themes of freedom, anti-discrimination, and individual autonomy. The directional analyses pertaining to this touchpoint contained questions about democracy and its countermodels (communism and dictatorship), as well as human rights.

The “skepticism about the exercise of state power” touchpoint is intended to capture questions that pertain to the coercive capacity of a state. Here, we mean to refer to coercive power as related to violence, rather than power as ideological or economic. Just as law enforcement agencies reflect organs of the state with coercive capacity domestically, we consider both military and intelligence agencies

²See Appendix D.4 for the five directional issue categories that did not relate to the touchpoints.

as organs of the state that can exercise this capacity overseas. Activities and policy tools that involve violence, such as war, terrorism, counter-terror efforts, nuclear weapons, and military bases, were also grouped into this category. Overall, this category centers around violence and coercive influence.

The “equitable access to resources” touchpoint is designed to compile questions related to tangible resources or public goods and their distribution. The majority of the questions in this category are related to economic topics, like aid and trade. Moreover, we consider questions related to the environment, climate change, and global warming to belong in this category. Just as rights to housing, education, and healthcare (all issues added in this category for the absolute gap analyses) might be considered rights and freedoms, rights to the environment could be, as well. However, in all of these cases, we believe that the tangible resources associated with the rights – and their implications for distributional issues – distinguish these topics as more relevant to equitable access.

Finally, the “solidarity with marginalized groups” touchpoint includes issues involving discrimination, oppression, targeting of, or subordination of other groups of people. The logic here is that Black Americans may feel that they have an understanding of individuals whom they consider to be similarly marginalized. The only group of questions fitting this description that are ordered directionally in the dataset is the group of questions about immigration.

A.1.2 Coding for absolute gap analyses

There are some differences between how categories are coded in the directional and non-directional analyses. Because of the need for questions to be comparable and unidimensional, the analyses in the directional analysis section contain only the 815 questions pertaining to a specific set of foreign policy questions that fit the criteria described above. In contrast, the dataset for the absolute gap analysis contains a wider range of questions: questions covering other issues, questions covering issues that occurred only once or twice across the surveys, questions that could not be mapped directionally with the rest of the questions in that issue category, and so on. For example, in 2014, respondents were asked to assess the effect of NAFTA on the environment. This question cannot be included in the directional analysis since unlike the other trade questions, it doesn’t capture support for free trade, and unlike the other environment questions, it doesn’t measure support for the environment, but it clearly implicates both issues. It is thus excluded from the directional analysis, but included in the absolute analysis. Similarly, in the directional analyses, each question included in the analysis

is linked to only one of the four touchpoint categories based on its foreign policy issue membership, but in the absolute gap analyses, individual questions can be categorized as belonging to as many of the touchpoints as are applicable. For example, a question from 2002 asked respondents whether they supported helping poor countries develop their economies as a means of combatting terrorism: as a counterterrorism question, it implicates the use of state power touchpoint, while in its focus on foreign aid, it also implicates the equitable access to resources touchpoint.

In addition to these touchpoint codings, a number of other classifications of questions are included in the non-directional analyses, as well. Tables A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5 provide additional details about how we extended our coding in order to fit non-directional questions into relevant categories for the absolute gap analyses.

Table A1: Coding of Foreign Policy Issues for Directional Analysis (I)

Issue	Coding Rules
Human Rights	Any question about basic human rights, including: general questions about human rights; rights for people with disabilities; refugee protection; genocide; apartheid; and treatment of various marginalized groups. This category includes questions about specific historical events involving human rights; for example, the “Chinese crackdown” in Tiananmen Square, the “situation in Northern Ireland” (religious violence) in the 1990s during the Clinton administration, and others.
Communist Threat	Any question making direct reference to the threat of communism. Category does NOT include all questions about Communist countries (i.e., Cuba, China, etc.); communism must be directly referenced. This allows for a more conservative test and is less susceptible to variation in whether respondents are more or less able to identify countries by their political systems.
Communist Cooperation	Any question mentioning international forms of cooperation with communist countries, such as: exchange; diplomatic agreements/establishing diplomatic relations; backing or supporting a government; treaties and trade agreements; alliances; international organizations; multilateral efforts; or nonproliferation efforts. Again, this category does not include all questions about Communist countries; communism must be directly referenced.
Dictator Cooperation	Any question mentioning international forms of cooperation with dictatorships. Again, dictatorship must be directly referenced.
Spreading Democracy	Any question relevant to themes usually associated with democracy, such as: democracy promotion; pro-democracy support; protection of civil liberties; or democratization.

Table A2: Coding of Foreign Policy Issues for Directional Analysis (II)

Issue	Coding Rules
Espionage	Any question referring to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), or spying, in general.
Military Bases	Any question related to whether the United States should have long-term military bases in a given country.
Nuclear Arms Control	Any question pertaining to nuclear weapons, such as: questions about nuclear proliferation or non-proliferation; preventing specific countries from building nuclear weapons/enriching uranium; arms control; diplomacy or use of force in the case of nuclear threats.
Use of Force	Any question pertinent to the hypothetical or actual use of military force, such as: questions about the conditions under which respondents would support sending troops; use of force against terrorists; authorization of force by the United Nations; particular wars and deployments of troops or strikes. Questions asking about a “situation” involving force, such as a 1994 question about the U.S. response to the “situation in Haiti,” are included.
Military Superiority	Any question about the importance of maintaining or improving U.S. military superiority globally.
Terrorism Threat	Any question involving the threat of terrorism or respondents’ sense of safety in the wake of terrorist events. We categorize any questions about “violent Islamic extremism” as terrorism, but not questions that refer solely to “Islamic fundamentalism.”
Terrorism Liberties	Any question related to taking away civil liberties for the sake of counter-terrorism (e.g., racial profiling at airports or torturing terrorism suspects).
Terrorism Cooperation	Any question about cooperation with other countries to address terrorism.
Terrorism Force	Any question related to combating terrorism through the use of force.

Table A3: Coding of Foreign Policy Issues for Directional Analysis (III)

Issue	Coding Rules
Economic Aid Support	Any question involving support for economic aid or simply “aid/foreign aid” to other countries, such as: questions about levels of aid to specific countries or questions about approval of economic aid.
Military Aid Support	Any question involving support for military aid or selling military equipment to other countries, including questions about levels of or support for military aid. Category includes both questions about selling military equipment that don’t mention the word “aid” and questions about “military aid” that do not mention sales.
Economic Aid Efficacy	Any question related to the effects of economic aid.
Military Aid Efficacy	Any question related to the effects of military aid.
Immigration	Any question related to immigration, restriction of migration, or refugee flows. In some cases, questions ask specifically about views of legal or illegal immigration.
Combating Hunger	Any question about the importance of combating global hunger.
Standard of Living	Any question asking whether respondents think it is important to raise the standard of living for other countries.
International Trade	Any question about global trade issues, such as: trade agreements; tariffs and other barriers to trade; the effects of trade; globalization; and the fairness of trade. Questions about selling military equipment to various foreign countries were treated as military aid/arms sales questions (as opposed to being categorized as questions about trade).
Environment	Any question related to climate change or the environment, such as: general questions about climate change; global warming; environmental standards; pollution control; or protecting or improving the environment.

Table A4: Additional Coding Schemes

Category Name	Coding Rules
Regional codings	A series of dichotomous variables indicating whether a question is pertinent to Africa, Europe, the Americas, Asia, or the Middle East.
Importance	Any question referring to the importance of various foreign policy goals. Some questions ask for the more important of two goals (e.g., econ. vs. mil. strength).
Vital Interests	Any question related to whether a particular country is of vital interest to the U.S. Countries are mentioned by name; some questions ask which of two countries is more important to the United States (e.g., China vs. Japan).
Threat Perception	Any question involving the extent to which a respondent sees a phenomenon, issue, or actor as threatening. Questions include diverse topics such as terrorism, a communist takeover in various countries, immigration to the United States, and climate change.
Importance	Any question evaluating whether something should be an important foreign policy goal for the United States (e.g., improving the environment, controlling immigration, stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, etc.).
Feeling Thermometer	Any question utilizing a feeling thermometer to rate respondents' feelings towards a given leader (e.g., Shinzo Abe, Donald Trump, Justin Trudeau) or country (e.g. South Korea, Great Britain, Russia).
Domestic Only	Any question involving strictly domestic issues (e.g. US healthcare and education spending). Excludes issues that deal with both domestic and foreign policy (e.g. climate change, economic competition, immigration).

Table A5: Coding of Touchpoints

Category Name	Coding Rules	Notes
Rights	The criteria for coding this category for the directional analysis involved including questions coded as relevant to democracy, communism, or human rights.	For the absolute gap analysis, questions about standards for working conditions and civil liberties (i.e., racial profiling and torture of terror suspects) were added to this category.
Power	The criteria for coding this category for the directional analysis involved including questions coded as relevant to military bases, nuclear issues, use of force, terrorism, or espionage.	For the absolute gap analysis, questions about the role of the U.S. military in foreign policy, U.S. involvement in peacekeeping and multilateral force operations, whether military aid is a good substitute for the use of American troops, maintaining superior military power/military strength of the United States, matching the military strength of the Soviet Union, and the effect of the U.S. military presence on regions like the Middle East were added to this category. The following one-off questions were also added: personal concerns about gun violence, support for a treaty to ban landmines, and whether the U.S. should play “world policeman.”
Resources	The criteria for coding this category for the directional analysis involved including questions coded as relevant to aid, trade, or the environment/climate change.	For the absolute gap analysis, questions about combatting world hunger, developing the economies/improving the standard of living in poor countries, economic competition from other countries, and domestic spending on education, healthcare, welfare, drug prevention, crime prevention, highways, housing, farming, and social security were added to this category. The following one-off questions were also added: whether bank loans to developing countries should be guaranteed, whether the U.S. should sign a treaty governing use of the sea, support for a tax for finding new sources of energy to avoid dependence on foreign gasoline, and whether or not world population growth is a critical threat.
Solidarity	The criteria for coding this category for the directional analysis involved including questions coded as relevant to immigration.	For the absolute gap analysis, questions about Africa, and countries in the Caribbean (Haiti and Grenada) were added to this category. Because of the increased level of prejudice experienced by Muslims after 9/11, questions about Islamic fundamentalism were added, but only if they were asked after 2001. However, we do not include any questions referring to “radical” or violent Islam. A one-off question in 1994 about the U.S. response to the situation in Cuba was included in this category because this question coincided with the Cuba Raft Crisis (immigration-related). A one-off question from 2002 was added that reads: “Please tell me which of the following statements is closer to your own view: ‘Because Muslim religious, social and political traditions are incompatible with Western ways, violent conflict between the two civilizations is inevitable.’ OR ‘Because most Muslims are like people everywhere, we can find common ground and violent conflict between the civilizations is not inevitable.’” Two one-off questions from 1975 were also added to the category: a question about whether it is “important in foreign affairs for us to keep a close relationship with those countries that have similar traditions and appreciation of freedom such as England and France” (assuming that people of African descent might generally feel <i>less</i> solidarity with these places) and a question about whether the U.S. “should try to maintain close ties and friendly relations with the countries from which our people’s ancestors came.”

B Theoretical underpinnings

B.1 Rooting our touchpoints in Black political thought

While there is no single canonical typology of Black values that can encapsulate all Black thought on politics, in our reading, Black political movements and theories have consistently converged around four key themes: 1) political rights, 2) condemnation of state violence, 3) distributive justice, and 4) expanding gains of the struggle beyond the bounds of Black America. In other words, we consider these categories to be applicable to a vast and disparate set of Black political ideologies ranging from reform-oriented movements like civil rights platforms and Black liberalism to liberation discourses like Black nationalism, Black feminism, and Black Marxism. We also see these themes as relevant to Black political thought across time periods (i.e., Black activism in the Cold War era, the Civil Rights Movement, Black Power, and inequality-focused movements as in [Marable 2009](#)).

[Dawson \(2001\)](#) describes a set of five overarching ideological frameworks that characterize Black political thinking across time in American history. They include: Black nationalism, Black feminism, Black Marxism, Black liberalism, and Black conservatism. In a survey in the early 1990s, Dawson categorized 99% of Black Americans in one of the first four ideologies, and only one percent of the population in the conservatism category ([Dawson, 2001](#), p. 83). If partisanship is any indication, levels of Black conservatism are still relatively low: in 2016, about 6% of Black Americans voted for Donald Trump, the Republican presidential candidate, and in 2020, 8% voted for him ([Hartig et al., 2025](#)).³

In Tables [A6-A7](#), we discuss how the four themes that we identify in the manuscript have manifested in the four major ideologies that have historically been prevalent in Black politics, as well as in explicit references to international politics.

C Measuring Black-White gaps

As noted in the manuscript, we measure racial gaps in foreign policy preferences using two different measures. The first is what we refer to as a *directional gap*, or $g_i = \bar{x}_{b,i} - \bar{x}_{w,i}$, where $\bar{x}_{b,i}$ indicates the average response to question i among Black respondents, and $\bar{x}_{w,i}$ indicates the average response

³These margins may change in future years. In 2024, an estimated 15% of Black voters chose Trump over Democratic contender Kamala Harris. Given that our data only extends to 2018, these changes transcend the timeframe of our study.

Table A6: Four Themes in Black Political Thought (I)

Ideology	Political Rights	Condemning State Violence	Distributive Justice	Expanding Bounds of Struggle
Black Liberalism				
Key focus areas	Niagara Movement for voting rights (1900s) (Rudwick, 1957)	NAACP fight against mob justice in the Jim Crow South (Francis, 2014)	Anti-poverty advocacy of the National Urban League	Focus of 19th century Black educational institutions (i.e., Hampton Institute, Tuskegee Institute) on African development (West, 1992)
	Civil-rights movement's focus on equal rights (Aldridge, 2011 , pp. 208-284)	Criminal-justice reform movement	Operation PUSH campaigns for corporate hiring and investment in Black communities (1980s) NAACP campaigns for environmental and climate justice (NAACP, 2025)	Visits by delegations of civil-rights leaders to newly liberated African states
International touchpoints	Advocacy against international oppression by W.E.B. DuBois, Ralph Bunche, Bayard Rustin	Anti-war advocacy of Paul Robeson, Martin Luther King, Jesse Jackson	Congresional Black Caucus support for foreign aid	Anti-apartheid movement by TransAfrica
Black Nationalism				
Key focus areas	Legal rights philosophy of Nation of Islam	Republic of New Afrika campaigns against police violence (1960s-70s)	Kwanzaa's <i>Ujamaa</i> (co-operative economics), as promoted by Maulana Karenga and the Us Organization (Karenga, 1998)	Martin Delany's call for nation-building in Africa
	Stokely Carmichael's teaching on voting rights in the Deep South (Summerville, 2022 , p. 246)	Prison abolition advocacy of Angela Davis (Davis, 2011)	Black Panther free breakfast program and health clinics	Travel and exile of Stokely Carmichael, Malcolm X, Assata Shakur to the global south
International touchpoints	Malcolm X and his Organization of Afro-American Unity's plan to bring the U.S. before the UN for human rights abuses against African Americans (Felber, 2015 , p. 203)	Anti-draft stance of Republik of New Afrika and Black Panther Party (Davenport, 2015 , p. 68)	Nation of Islam's International Trades Division importing fish from Peru for Black families (Johnson, 1974)	Garveyism as an international anti-colonial movement

Table A7: Four Themes in Black Political Thought (II)

Ideology	Political Rights	Condemning State Violence	Distributive Justice	Expanding Bounds of Struggle
Black Feminism				
Key focus areas	National Black Feminism	Attention of Black women's organizations to police violence against black youth (1960s) (Mikell, 2000, p. 68)	Combahee River Collective push to reorganize society to prioritize care of the needs of most oppressed (Taylor, 2020, p. 13)	Third World Women's Alliance's work with <i>Unión Latina</i> to support new immigrants (1970s) (Romney, 2021, p. 245)
	Organization critiquing mainstream feminism for excluding Black women (Taylor, 2020, p. 11)	Women-led, feminist-grounded Black Lives Matter movement (2010s) (Brewer, 2019, p. 47)	Commitment to addressing economic exploitation of Black women in domestic work roles (Jones, 1949, p. 34-35)	Radical Black women's visits with Communist and Pan-African organizations abroad (Africa, Caribbean, the USSR, etc; 1940s-70s) (McDuffie, 2012, 1,4)
International touchpoints	African American Women for Reproductive Freedom and SisterSong's focus on reproductive rights (Price, 2020)			
International touchpoints	Josephine Baker's civil rights advocacy in Europe (Baker, 1957)	Black women in the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom protesting U.S. intervention in Haiti/Liberia (1910s-30s) (Blackwell, 2004, chap 5)	National Council for Negro Women training African woman entrepreneurs (1970s-80s) (Mikell, 2000, p. 70-71)	International Council of Women of the Darker Races (1922-40), created by the National Association of Colored Women and attended by women from India, Haiti, and Africa (Materson, 2009, p. 36)
Black Marxism				
Key focus areas	Black Marxists' support for workers' rights (i.e., Fletcher Jr. 2020)	DuBois' condemning chattel slavery and labor exploitation after Marxist turn (Du Bois, 1935, 1998, p. 8-9)	Viewing racism as a barrier to working class unification (Hall et al., 2017, p. 346)	Vision of a diaspora-wide "Black collective identity" against racial capitalism (Robinson, 1983, 2020, p. 357)
		Tying Southern lynching to capitalism (Randolph and Owen, 1919, p. 9)	Centrality of fight against economic injustice (Shelby, 2021, p. 43)	Casting Third World countries as vanguard in global class struggle (Walsh, 2022, p. 504)
International touchpoints	Anticolonial, anti-imperialist stance of the early Howard school (Vitalis, 2016, chap. 1)	Black Alliance for Peace anti-militarization campaigns (Black Alliance for Peace, 2025)	Council on African Affairs campaigns to address famine in Africa (1940s) (Von Eschen, 1997, p. 76-79)	Use of Socialist principles to discuss oppression in Africa, Asia, etc. by Domingo and others (1910s) (Makalani, 2011, p. 58-63)

to question i among White respondents.⁴ Thus, on questions measuring support for free trade (scaled such that positive values indicate greater support), a positive directional gap would indicate that Black respondents are on average more supportive of trade openness than White respondents are, while a negative directional gap would indicate that Black respondents are on average less supportive than White respondents are. The second is what we refer to as an *absolute gap*, $g_i = |\bar{x}_{b,i} - \bar{x}_{w,i}|$, which measures how much Black and White respondents disagree with one another on a question i , focusing on the magnitude of the disagreement, rather than the direction. Each measure has its own advantages: the directional gap is perhaps the most intuitive, but because it is only interpretable for specific subsets of questions that can be scaled along a single dimension, it is poorly suited for aggregating across the full landscape of foreign policy attitudes, unlike the absolute gap, which enables us to aggregate across all items simultaneously in a multivariate context.

Both measures, though, are superior to another alternative, which would measure racial gaps using correlation coefficients or R^2 statistics. For purposes of illustration, consider the stylized examples in Figure A1, in which each of the 10 points in each panel represents a different polling question, where the average response among White respondents ($\bar{x}_w$) is shown on the x-axis, and the average response among Black respondents ($\bar{x}_b$) is shown on the y-axis. The more Black and White respondents agree with one another on foreign policy, the closer their average answers to polling questions should be to the dashed diagonal line. In panel (a), Black and White respondents are on average 7 percentage points off from one another, while in panel (b) they are on average 35 percentage points off from one another— a racial gap of five times the size. Yet because correlation coefficients capture both the aggregate strength of a relationship and the variance of the sample (Achen, 1977), they mismeasure our quantity of interest, presuming more congruence between Black and White responses in panel (b) than is warranted.


D Supplementary analysis

D.1 Absolute log-odds gaps

The absolute gap analysis in the main text compares the absolute value of the difference between the average response to question i from Black respondents, and the average response to question i

⁴For both of our measures, to ensure meaningful comparisons of racial gaps across items, we rescale all items so that their response options range from 0 to 1.

Figure A1: Correlation coefficients poorly suited to studying racial gaps



Note: The simulated data in Figure A1 show how correlation coefficients do not properly capture our quantity of interest. In panel (a) Black and White respondents are on average 7 percentage points off from one another (a directional – and absolute – racial gap of 0.07), while in panel (b) Black and White respondents are on average 35 percentage points off from one another (a directional and absolute racial gap of five times the size of its predecessor: 0.35, which is obscured by the higher correlation coefficient in panel (b) than panel (a)).

from White respondents ($|\bar{x}_{b,i} - \bar{x}_{w,i}|$). Since these levels of support are bounded between $[0, 1]$, one might also be interested in differentially weighting the differences based on where they fall within the interval, under the assumption that a gap of size g_i may be more meaningful for policies that are highly popular, rather than for policies that receive middling support. As a robustness check, we therefore estimate an alternative absolute gap measure, expressed as the absolute difference in log-odds: $|\log(\frac{\bar{y}_{b,i}}{1-\bar{y}_{b,i}}) - \log(\frac{\bar{y}_{w,i}}{1-\bar{y}_{w,i}})|$.

Table A8 replicates Table 4 from the main text using this alternative estimand. The main patterns from the table remain the same. Items capturing any touchpoint display significantly larger gaps: foreign policy questions related to the solidarity with marginalized groups touchpoint have the largest statistically significant effect, followed by foreign policy questions related to the equitable access to resources touchpoint, and then by the skepticism about the exercise of state power touchpoint. The effects persist in Model 3, in which we control for partisan polarization.

D.2 Sensitivity analysis

In this section, we conduct a sensitivity analysis to determine whether or not our findings are beholden to our coding choices. In our analysis in the main text, we emphasize the ideological aspect

Table A8: Modeling Variation in Absolute Gaps (Log Odds Scale)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Any Touchpoint	0.039** (0.015)		
Rights and Freedoms		−0.022 (0.029)	−0.015 (0.029)
Skepticism about State Power		0.035* (0.019)	0.042** (0.019)
Equitable Access to Resources		0.050*** (0.019)	0.048** (0.019)
Solidarity with other Marginalized Groups		0.129*** (0.035)	0.130*** (0.037)
Partisan Polarization			0.172** (0.076)
Year	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)
Constant	1.474 (1.062)	1.687 (1.071)	1.971* (1.064)
N	1,504	1,504	1,388
R ²	0.005	0.015	0.019

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

of opposition to communism and support for spreading democracy, and the resource-transfer aspect of military aid, but one might also consider these three to be security issues, thus potentially implicating the exercise of state power. Similarly, in our analysis in the main text we focus on the security aspects of arms control, the ideological aspect of cooperating with dictators, and the resource-based dynamic of concern for the environment, but one could also consider the former two issues to involve questions of resource allocation, and climate to implicate questions of rights instead. Model 1 of Table A9 presents the main model from Table 4 in the main paper, in which skepticism about state power and empathy for other marginalized groups represent the two touchpoints with the strongest effects. Model 2 replicates these results, but when recoding three issues plausibly related to security (military aid, spreading democracy, and the threat of communism) as implicating the exercise of state power touchpoint. Model 3 does the same, but adjusting the touchpoint codings of the other three issues (arms control, cooperating with dictators, and support for the environment) to implicate resources and rights, respectively. Finally, Model 4 implements both sets of changes simultaneously.

Crucially, skepticism about state power and empathy for other marginalized groups remain our strongest and most consistent results, replicating the results from the main text. There are some

fluctuations here with rights and freedoms (as Figure 6 in the main text shows, spreading democracy has a relatively small absolute gap, so recategorizing it away from rights and freedoms increases the magnitude of the rights and freedoms coefficient) and with resources (climate has a relatively large absolute gap, so moving it away from resources decreases the magnitude of our resources coefficient). However, our substantive conclusions remain the same. Altogether, this bolsters our confidence in the robustness of our main results.

Table A9: Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Touchpoint Categorizations


	Absolute Racial Gap			
	Original Codings	Security Focused Adjustments	Resource Focused Adjustments	Both Adjustments
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rights and Freedoms	0.0002 (0.006)	0.013 (0.008)	0.005 (0.005)	0.017** (0.006)
Skepticism about State Power	0.009** (0.004)	0.006* (0.003)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.008** (0.003)
Equitable Access to Resources	0.007* (0.004)	0.008* (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Solidarity with other Marginalized Groups	0.032*** (0.007)	0.032*** (0.007)	0.032*** (0.007)	0.032*** (0.007)
Year	-0.00002 (0.0001)	-0.00000 (0.0001)	-0.00002 (0.0001)	-0.00000 (0.0001)
Constant	0.116 (0.212)	0.071 (0.210)	0.108 (0.211)	0.072 (0.209)
N	1,504	1,504	1,504	1,504
R ²	0.018	0.018	0.019	0.020

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

D.3 Determining the bounds of Black solidarity

The manuscript shows that Black Americans have often expressed concern for other marginalized groups, which we capture in our solidarity touchpoints. To test the bounds of this solidarity, we first take advantage of the “use of force” questions in our dataset. Questions about the use of force often implicitly encourage respondents to pick a side in a conflict. For this reason, they can plausibly represent Black-White differences in levels of concern for other international groups. In Figure A2, we map Black-White gaps in support of the use of force across a wide range of international conflicts. Points on the plots represent Black and White support for specific conflicts mentioned in the surveys. Any conflicts falling exactly on the diagonals would have equal levels of support among Black and White respondents. So, for example, the question about the 1975 conflict labeled “W. Germany-


Figure A2: Measuring solidarity through war support



Panels represent surveys from each year used in the dataset. Labels on the plots provide information about how the question was framed in each survey. Labels with a hyphen indicate that the question asked about using force to support the first country/region mentioned, and that force would be used against the second country/region/issue mentioned.

In cases where there is no hyphen, only one side is specified in the question. Labels with a "/" generally indicate a question about deploying troops to support maintain peace between two sides (i.e., Israel/Palestine or India/Pakistan). Darker dots indicate statistical significance controlling for multiple comparisons using Benjamini-Hochberg adjustments.

Figure A3: Measuring solidarity through aid support



Panels represent surveys from each year used in the dataset. Darker dots indicate statistical significance controlling for multiple comparisons using Benjamini-Hochberg adjustments.

USSR” asks if respondents would favor or oppose U.S. troop involvement if “[t]he Russians took over West Berlin.” The conflict received more support from White respondents than it did from Black respondents.

The plots show that Black American solidarity most often lies with other Black nations (Angola, Haiti, South Africa), and with those affected by issues that are easily translated to the experience of Black discrimination (force to prevent the flow of drugs, force to stop genocide of the Rohingya). Black respondents were also significantly more supportive of interventions in Syria in 2014. We find it telling that this support coincides with the Obama presidency. Previous research shows that preferences for policies promoted by Barack Obama became racialized during his presidency, such as healthcare (Tesler, 2012) and domestic vs. defense spending (Green-Riley and Leber, 2023).

We do not assume that the trends in the plot are the result of Black preferences alone – these gaps also emerge due to White preferences. For example, the plots make clear that White Americans were more likely to favor intervening on the behalf of Albanians facing ethnic violence in Kosovo. The plots also indicate that Black respondents were less likely compared to White respondents to support traditional allies and partners, like European nations, Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan. Outside of the 2014 Syria questions, Black respondents were also generally less likely to support conflicts in the Middle East. We interpret these results to mean that solidarity for both Black and White Americans depends on a combination of three factors: racial homophily, issues that remind respondents of their domestic political experience, and the level of importance attached to various partnerships and alliances with countries overseas.

We find similar patterns in Figure A3, which measures solidarity using questions capturing support for foreign aid. The figure shows Black respondents are generally more supportive of foreign aid than White respondents are, but also that support for aid is especially high when the recipients are majority-Black nations. These findings offer an interesting juxtaposition with Baker (2015), who studies support for foreign aid among White Americans, finding that White Americans display racial paternalism rather than “uncharitable resentment,” supporting Black aid recipients over White aid recipients. While it is broadly the case that White respondents express greater support for African aid recipients than non-African ones (although unlike Baker 2015’s experimental contexts, we cannot disentangle paternalism from perceived need), it is also the case that Black respondents express greater support for African aid recipients than White respondents do. Black solidarity and White paternalism


may thus operate on opposite sides of the racial gap in aid preferences, with the former widening it and the latter compressing it. If [Baker \(2015\)](#) is correct that racial paternalism is inflating White Americans’ support for aid to African countries, then the Black-White gap we observe may actually be a lower bound on the degree to which racial solidarity drives Black Americans’ support for African aid recipients.

D.4 Additional directional categories

The analysis in Figures 2–4 in the main text presents directional gaps across 24 different foreign policy issues relating to our four touchpoints. Figure A4 presents directional gaps across five additional sets of foreign policy issue areas that do not cleanly fit into one of our four touchpoints, but which are also one-dimensional, allowing for directional analysis. We present them here for the sake of completeness. As before, in the left-hand panels, each point denotes a different polling question (accompanied by 95% confidence intervals), with the y-axis indicating the directional gap for that question, and the x-axis indicating the year that question was fielded. The right-hand panel aggregates across all survey items in a given foreign policy issue, presenting the meta-analytic effect from a random effects meta-analysis (once again, with 95% confidence intervals).

The first three issue areas relate to energy policy: the perceived effect of foreign policy on gas prices, the perceived importance of energy, and support for international energy cooperation more generally. For each of these three energy considerations, Black respondents agree with the premise of the question significantly less than White respondents: they are less likely to perceive foreign policy as affecting gas prices, they perceive energy issues as significantly less important, and they are significantly less supportive of the U.S. pursuing international energy cooperation. The fourth issue area concerns approval of presidential handling of foreign policy. Here, the average directional gap is not statistically significant, but as the left-hand panel of Figure A4 shows, this belies considerable temporal heterogeneity: during the Clinton administration, Black respondents express greater approval of presidential handling of foreign policy than White respondents do, while during the Ford, Reagan, and Bush administrations, Black respondents express lower approval than White respondents do. This points to the importance of accounting for partisan confounds, as we do in the absolute gap analysis. Finally, Black respondents are significantly less concerned about trade deficits than are White respondents.

Figure A4: Additional directional analysis



In panels on the left, each point marks the magnitude and direction of the difference in Black and White attitudes on a given poll question. The point's location on the x-axis denotes the year when the question was asked. In plots on the right, the points depict a meta-analytic estimate of the directional gap across the subcategory as a whole. The meta-analytic point estimate is an open circle if it is not statistically significant at the $\alpha = 0.05$ level, and it is closed if it is statistically significant.

D.5 Controlling for other types of demographic polarization

The absolute gap analysis in Table 4 in the main text estimates the effects of each of the four touchpoints controlling for partisan polarization, and in that analysis, partisanship does not change our results. Yet there are other potential forms of demographic polarization we may also wish to control for, such that we might want to know how the magnitude of the absolute gap changes when we control for these additional confounds. Given that demographic variables were measured differently across different years, we adopt a relatively simple approach by first generating a set of dummy variables in the full dataset, corresponding to respondents’ gender (a dichotomous variable denoting whether respondents identified as male), education (a dichotomous variable denoting whether respondents had a four-year college degree or above), age (a dichotomous variable produced by mean-splitting the age responses within each survey wave), and income (a dichotomous variable produced by mean-splitting the income responses within each survey wave).⁵ For each of the 1,504 questions, we then calculate $\bar{x}_{d=1,i} - \bar{x}_{d=0,i}$, the difference between the average level of support for question i between men and women, college-educated versus non-college educated respondents, older versus younger respondents, and higher-income versus lower-income respondents, producing measures of gender-based polarization, education-based polarization, age-based polarization, and income-based polarization, respectively. Table A10 presents these results, showing that the results remain the same.

D.6 Subsetting to a Democrat-only sample

We also replicate our main analysis on a Democrat-only sample. Since Black Americans are overwhelmingly Democrats (e.g. White and Laird, 2020), this analysis enables us to investigate Black-White differences among co-partisans. When subsetting to just Democratic partisans, racial gaps for our two largest touchpoints — relating to skepticism about the exercise of state power and solidarity with other marginalized groups — remain statistically significant. In contrast, the aggregate touchpoint variable and the access to resources variable no longer show statistically significant differences. These results lend evidence to the argument that our main results are not simply driven by partisanship — even beyond partisan dynamics, Black Americans appear to have distinctive preferences for foreign policy.

⁵We adopt this mean-splitting approach because different survey waves feature different scales for age and income; these variables therefore indicate whether respondents were in the top or bottom half of the age and income distributions.

Table A10: Modeling Variation in Absolute Gaps, Controlling for Other Types of Polarization

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Any Touchpoint	0.009*** (0.003)			
Rights and Freedoms		0.0002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)
Skepticism about State Power		0.009** (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	0.008* (0.004)
Equitable Access to Resources		0.007* (0.004)	0.008** (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)
Solidarity with other Marginalized Groups		0.032*** (0.007)	0.033*** (0.007)	0.034*** (0.007)
Partisan Polarization			0.018 (0.015)	0.028 (0.018)
Age Polarization				0.052* (0.030)
Gender Polarization				−0.160*** (0.038)
Educational Polarization				−0.054* (0.031)
Income Polarization				0.101** (0.049)
Year	−0.00000 (0.0001)	−0.00002 (0.0001)	−0.00004 (0.0001)	−0.0001 (0.0001)
Constant	0.074 (0.211)	0.116 (0.212)	0.145 (0.212)	0.249 (0.213)
N	1,504	1,504	1,388	1,388
R ²	0.006	0.018	0.020	0.040

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table A11: Modeling Variation in Absolute Gaps among Democrats

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Any Touchpoint	0.004 (0.003)		
Rights and Freedoms		0.0004 (0.006)	0.0003 (0.006)
Skepticism about State Power		0.010*** (0.004)	0.010*** (0.004)
Equitable Access to Resources		-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
Solidarity with other Marginalized Groups		0.024*** (0.007)	0.024*** (0.007)
Partisan Polarization			-0.003 (0.015)
Year	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.00005 (0.0001)	0.00005 (0.0001)
Constant	-0.120 (0.207)	-0.027 (0.209)	-0.032 (0.210)
N	1,388	1,388	1,388
R ²	0.002	0.015	0.015

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

D.7 Dropping domestic issues

The dataset includes a small number of questions (45 out of 1,504) measuring domestic policy attitudes, typically about government spending priorities (for example, whether farm subsidies should be expanded, cut back, or kept about the same). Table A12 replicates Table 4 from the main text while dropping these issues, showing that equitable access to resources is no longer statistically significant, while skepticism about state power and solidarity with other marginalized groups continue to display the largest effects.

D.8 Racial polarization over time

Figure 1 in the main text plots the variation in racial gaps the paper is seeking to explain. After correcting for multiple comparisons using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure, 31.7% of the questions in the data display statistically significant racial gaps. Table A13 disaggregates the data by year, suggesting there do not seem to be marked trends in racial polarization over time.

Table A12: Modeling Variation in Absolute Gaps (Dropping Domestic Questions)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Any Touchpoint	0.008** (0.003)		
Rights and Freedoms		0.001 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)
Skepticism about State Power		0.009** (0.004)	0.010** (0.004)
Equitable Access to Resources		0.004 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)
Solidarity with other Marginalized Groups		0.033*** (0.007)	0.034*** (0.007)
Partisan Polarization			0.004 (0.016)
Year	-0.00002 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Constant	0.112 (0.213)	0.177 (0.214)	0.182 (0.214)
N	1,459	1,459	1,348
R ²	0.004	0.019	0.019

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table A13: The Prevalence of Statistically Significant Racial Gaps by Year

	Year	Pr(Significant)
1	1975	0.239
2	1978	0.285
3	1982	0.281
4	1986	0.457
5	1990	0.355
6	1994	0.31
7	1998	0.563
8	2002	0.247
9	2004	0.211
10	2014	0.362
11	2016	0.294
12	2018	0.371

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